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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.

:

DAVID K. PETIT,

: Case No. 960032-CA
Priority No. 2
:

Defendant/Appellant.

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1995).

STATUTES, RULES, AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The following are set forth in full in Addendum A:
U.S. Const, amend. IV
Utah Const, art. I, § 14
Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-15 (1995)

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Whether evidence should have been suppressed because the
seizure of Mr. Petit constituted an arrest without probable cause
in violation of the fourth amendment to the federal constitution
and article I, section 14 of the Utah constitution?
Standard of review.

The trial court's determination of

probable cause or reasonable suspicion is reviewed for correctness,
while granting some measure of discretion to the trial court in
applying the standard to a given set of facts.

State v. Hodson,

907 P.2d 1155, 1157 (Utah 1995); State v. Poole, 871 P.2d 531, 533

(Utah

1994);

State

v.

Pena,

869

P.2d

932,

939

(Utah

1994).

Preserved below by motion to suppress, R. 20-21, the hearing held
thereon, R. 97-139, and appellant's conditional plea, R. 66-7, 6977.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
David K. Petit was charged by information with possession
(3rd degree felony) and drug paraphernalia

of cocaine

misdemeanor).

R. 4-5.

(class B

Mr. Petit filed a motion to suppress all

evidence obtained as a result of his unlawful detention and arrest,
R.

20-21,

which was

denied.

R.

55-8

decision). 1

(memorandum

Pursuant to a conditional plea agreement, Mr. Petit pled guilty to
attempted

possession

of

a

controlled

substance

(class

A

misdemeanor), reserving the right to appeal the denial of his
motion to suppress.
of

R. 69-77 (Statement of defendant, certificate

counsel, and order) , 66-7

(minute entry) .

sentenced to probation for two years.

Mr.

Petit

R.

77-8.

a

transcript

was

This appeal

ensued.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The

parties

stipulated

that

of

the

preliminary hearing could be used for purposes of deciding the
motion to suppress. R. 98. A copy of this transcript is contained
at R. 23-52.

This transcript reveals the following:

^Although the court requested that the State prepare findings
and conclusions, R. 57, no such findings or conclusions appear in
the record.
2

On October 13, 1994 at 7:55 P.M., officer Michael Tuttle
was patrolling on foot in uniform with officers Hoffman and Roland
at approximately 258 South Rio Grande.

R. 23-5, 47.

Officer

Tuttle observed:
I noticed that Mr. Petit was inside of the
truck that was facing south. As officers started walking
across the street, Mr. Petit made eye contact with an
officer then reached for something underneath or beyond
our vision.
R. 24.

Officer Tuttle was approximately 20 feet away; visibility

by overhead lighting was approximately 30-40 feet.

R. 25.

At the

preliminary hearing the officer characterized the motion as "lunged
forward," while his contemporaneously prepared report states that
Mr. Petit "suddenly reached down the side of the inside door as if
reaching

for, or throwing away something."

(police report).

R.

26, 34-36, 59

Officer Tuttle was "concerned that the occupant

was reaching for a weapon and [he] drew [his] pistol" and told him
to stop.

R. 26; 36-7, 43.

directly at Mr. Petit.

The officer pointed his loaded weapon

R. 38-9.

Officer Tuttle could not tell

what Mr. Petit was reaching for, and conceded that the movement was
consistent with something as innocuous as spilling a cup of coffee.
R. 37.
At that point in time, Mr. Petit was not free to leave.
R. 37, 40.

Mr. Petit complied with the command to stop, and the

subsequent command to let the officer see his hands and place them
on the

steering wheel.

R.

26-7, 37-8.

Officer Tuttle

"hollered and continued walking towards the truck."

3

R. 27.

then

Officer Hoffman was approximately 10 to 15 feet from the
truck when Officer Tuttle drew his weapon.
Hoffman,

on

the

passenger

side

of

the

syringes and informed Officer Tuttle.
noticed blood on Mr. Petit's left arm.

R.

48.

vehicle,
R. 28.

Officer

noticed

some

Officer Tuttle

R. 27. Mr. Petit was asked

to exit the vehicle, R. 27-8, some 10 to 15 seconds after the
encounter began.

R. 41.

Prior to asking Mr. Petit to exit the

vehicle, none of the officers asked Mr. Petit any questions.

R.

41.

Mr. Petit was handcuffed before any questions were asked.

R.

42.

The first question Mr. Petit was asked was whether he had any

more syringes.

R. 29.

At the time of the encounter with Mr. Petit, there had
been no calls of any reported crime, or any weapons.

R. 33, 47.

Prior to the time the officers started walking towards the truck,
there was nothing unusual going on with the vehicle.
The officers observed no offense being committed.

R. 35, 49.

R. 36, 48-9.

The No Warrant Arrest Fact Sheet describes the encounter
as follows:
Officers Tuttle and Hoffman were walking north
bound on Rio Grande Street.
Officer Tuttle noticed
movement inside of a parked pick up facing south bound.
The occupant inside suddenly reached down the side of the
inside door as if reaching for, or throwing away
something.
Officers were both concerned that the
occupant was reaching for a weapon and officer Tuttle
drew his firearm and told the occupant to put his hands
on top of the steering wheel. The occupant complied.
Hoffman went to the other side of the truck and looked in
thru an open window noticing several syringes. Hoffman
told this to Tuttle who noticed blood on the occupant ['] s
left arm at the inner elbow.
It should be noted that
officers have both been working the shelter area for some
time and have bought drugs undercover and made multiple
drug arrests. This blood spot on the occupants arm along
4

wi tA. v.. * * - . ^; L x ^ : 1 v_ ..-> ui^i v_*... . . 4 v -. i • *. -.. .i J v_ v ^ '»., x i, .i • i .t <- uuv, u p a n t
had been using drugs prior to contact with police.
Officer Tuttle th[e]n had the occupant (later id'd as
Petit) get out of the vehicle. As the A/P got out of the
vehicle, a can that was being used to cook cocaine fell
to the ground. A/P was handcuffed. When A/P got. u; ,
Officer Hoffman watched A/P underhand throw f:om his
right hand a syringe full of a. red liqu[i]d[.]
[W] hen
A/P was asked if there was any [ ] more syringes in the
truck he stated "just the one 1 was about to shoot up
with." A/P states that there isnt: enough cocaine in the
syringe to get; M m f • • anything. AP&P responded to put
a hold or A
R. 5 9 .
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ARGUMENT
POINT

I.

THE

POLICE

CONDUCT

IN

THIS

CASE

CONSTITUTED AN ARREST WITHOUT PROBABLE CAUSE.
In Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d
889

(1968)

the

Supreme

Court

approved

limited

detentions premised on reasonable suspicion.

investigative

"Our evaluation of

the proper balance that has to be struck in this type of case leads
us to conclude that there must be a narrowly drawn authority to
permit a reasonable search for weapons for the protection of the
police officer, where he has reason to believe that he is dealing
with an armed and dangerous individual, regardless of whether he
has probable cause to arrest the individual for a crime.
officer need not be absolutely certain that the individual
armed;

the

issue

is whether

a reasonably

prudent

man

in

The
is
the

circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his safety or
that of others was in danger."
A.

THERE IS
OCCURRED.

Terry, 3 92 U.S. at 27.
NO

QUESTION

THAT

A

SEIZURE

"We adhere to the view that a person is "seized" only
when, by means of physical

force or a show of authority, his

freedom of movement is restrained."

United States v. Mendenhall,

446 U.S. 544, 553, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 1877, 64 L.Ed.2d 497, 509 (1980)
(opinion of Stewart, J., joined by Rehnquist, J . ) .

For fourth

amendment purposes, a person is seized "only if, in view of all of
the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person
would have believed that he was not free to leave."
6

Id. at 554,
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(tit ah

1994) .

Petit, a reasonable person \free1
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leave
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whether
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limited
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B.

PQL1PP SEIZURES TPVP' i-,\
LEAST
INTRUSIVE
FP<;ANS
NECESSARY MUST BF PREMISED
CAUSE.

., _ _
__
REASONABLY
*. PROBABLE

" Tt is the State's burden to demonstrate that the seizure
it seeks to -Pistif\

r- <}-),•. i^.Vi:\r.

rj

.-, reasonable suspicion was

cona j i Loud oi. ii^ \ \ • vestigat ive seizure."
IPS. 491., c3f. •

-3 S.Ct. 1319, 13 2^, 7 - P 9i.2d 229, 238 (1983).
=! • .-!

•' T e n y
scope and execuL-:! ' xrouqh
States

v.

Novak,

y 70

::
:-e
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.

] :i mi te .d :i n

i-'ah1. restrictive means."
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valid

Florida v . Roy e r, 460

•• .

•

••

•
int->
"y

:•

] 98 9)
«

nproper

arrest:

United

= i: v

An
a

To qualify as an investigative stop, a police officer's
detention of a suspect must employ "the least intrusive
means reasonably available to verify or dispel .
suspicion in a short amount of time." [Florida v. Royer,
460 U.S. at 500] .
If the force used exceeds these
limits, an investigative stop is converted into an
arrest. United States v. Jones, 759 F.2d 633, 636 (8th
Cir.), cert, denied, 474 U.S. 837, 106 S.Ct. 113, 88
L.Ed.2d 92 (1985) (Jones).
Applying the "least intrusive means" standard
to the facts of a case requires that we balance the
competing interests of the police officer against those
of the private individual. In general, a police officer
may take steps reasonably necessary to protect his or her
personal safety and the safety of others and to maintain
the status quo of a situation while verifying or
dispelling suspicion in a short period of time. Id. at
636-37 (citation omitted). A number of factors are used
to determine whether the amount and kind of force used
was reasonable and consistent with an investigative stop.
These include: (1) the number of officers and police cars
involved, (2) the nature of the crime and whether there
is reason to believe the suspect is armed, (3) the
strength of
the officer's
articulable,
objective
suspicions, (4) the need for immediate action by the
officer, (5) the presence or lack of suspicious behavior
or movement by the person under observation, and (6)
whether there was an opportunity for the officer to have
made the stop in less threatening circumstances. Id. at
639-40.
United States v. Seelve, 815 F.2d 48, 50 (8th Cir. 1987).
Numerous cases illustrate the point.

In United States v.

Strickler, 490 F.2d 378 (9th Cir. 1974), police were conducting
surveillance of suspected cocaine dealers. The court held that the
defendant and the other passenger in his car were arrested at the
time that the police boxed his vehicle in with 3 squad cars and
pointed a gun at the occupants of the surrounded vehicle:
To decide the case at bench, we need not
prescribe precisely the point at which police action
which detains a suspect ceases to be a nonarrest seizure
and becomes an arrest; for we simply cannot equate an
armed approach to a surrounded vehicle whose occupants
have been commanded to raise their hands with the 'brief
stop of a suspicious individual in order to determine his
8

IderiL^Ly ... . - ^iiitain the Litaiu.: j^.., ^^n^nLaj. i., 2rtu,,^
obtaining mcr^ information* which was authorized in
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iriStart
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an intentior

:
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In United States v. Robertson, 83 3 F.2d

777

(9th Cir.

•••t(--pec ted metl lamphetami ne ] at • was stopped
i;V f.i',.iice on l.;ir- sidewalk:
We -; ..h-jiudc that the officers' detention of
• Steeprow at gunpoint was an arrest which required
probable cause. Steeprow was confronted by seven to ten
police officers, one of whom aimed his gun at her nose,
told her to freeze, and detained her for at least five
and perhaps fifteen minutes.
The restriction of her
liberty of movement was complete upon this encirclement
by officers who gave her orders at gunpoint:
. •
Steeprow was not armed, but the officers make no attempt
to discern if she was armed, thereby strongly suggesting
that they had not the slightest indication that she was
armed.
[cite omitted]
Nothing in the record suggests
that the display of force was necessary to ensure her
compliance with a request to stop,
[cites omitted]
Accordingly, the purpose of the asserted "Terry stop" -to allow the officers to investigate without fear of
flight or violence, see Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143,
92 S.Ct. 1921, 32 L.Ed.2d 61 2 (1972) -- was not served by
the intrusion, imposed.
Robertson, 83 3 F 2d it ; 8]

9

Numerous other cases are in accord.

E.g. United States

v. Marin, 669 F.2d 73, 81-2 (2nd Cir. 1982) (arrest occurred where
3 or 4 DEA cars blocked progress of vehicle, and agents surrounded
the vehicle with guns drawn) ; United States v. Larkin, 510 F.2d 13,
13

& n.l

(9th Cir.

1974)

("a

confrontation

with

a

vehicular

blockade and drawn weapons cannot be equated with an investigative
detention1'); United States v. Troutman, 458 F.2d 217, 220

(10th

Cir. 1972) (arrest was made at the time officers stopped vehicle
with drawn guns); United States v. Novak, 870 F.2d 1345 (7th Cir.
1989) (seizure of companion of drug courier in airport concourse by
six to nine officers at gunpoint exceeded bounds of Terry stop and
constituted an arrest); United States v. Melendez-Garcia, 28 F.3d
1046

(10th

Cir.

1994)

(training

weapons

on

stopped

vehicle,

ordering occupants to throw keys out the window, and ordering them
to put their hands out constituted an arrest).
United States v. King, 990 F.2d 1552 (10th Cir. 1993) is
particularly instructive with regard to the amount of force that
may appropriately be used to protect officer safety.

In King, an

officer approached a vehicle stopped as a result of traffic backed
up by an accident to request that the driver stop honking the car
horn.

The officer had a brief interaction with King, the driver,

and then noticed a handgun,with clip inserted, on the seat.

The

officer then drew her firearm, "pointed it at King, and ordered him
to place his hands on the steering wheel, threatening to shoot him
if he did not comply with her order."

10

990 F.2d at 1555.

The

officer radioed for a s s i n t ;i r r ^

when a s s i s t an c e a r r i v e d

K :i ng w a s

ordered from the car, to L.., knees, and handcuffed.
court

olticf*r!s

* . n;i- i

Defendants rich,

lit- , ' i s t c

the

9.9 0 F.2d at 156"]

encounter "

observation

Jidui tu t-nsuie her own s a f e t y

^<

n

during

Howeveii : , t h e c o u r t found

that

ij: ] oyed wet e 11 in: ireasonab] e :

.• Ei a c t u a ] IT

Here, Officer LeMasters drew her gun and pointed it at
King, threatening to shoot him if he did not comply wi" *
her orde: . H e r call f o r backup assistance led oth- ±.
officers to encircle Defendants' car with weapons drawn.
Officer Paione ordered King to his knees, a n d Officer
LeMasters handcuffed h i m after both Defendants were
separated from the pi.st.ol ,-m.l :
•
• longer presented
threat to the safety of d;.y ot the officers o r
bystanders.
This level oi «j-. svernmental intrusion o n
liberty
i:= wot remotely s i in i I• to ordering
Defendants"
a motorist to step out of h i s car and c a n hardly b e
consideredn d e m i n i m u s " Tsicl or a "mi- ~- •• in^',m.;pnipnre "
King, 990 I \2d at ] 562.
The court concluded that "Officei LeMasters' failure to
if -

c a S u

l i v _ ; ] i h i ii-4

v\

*] i l t - d t J u l i d i J I t ; .

Id.

>6 3

di sti nguished United States v__.__ Merritt , 6 ^':. K , 2d 1 26
cei L .

v 19 8

Tin

court

10 r h f

,.--.ui«.j

where
we held that the fact that officers approached t h e
defendant with guns drawn a n d pointed at him d i d n o t
render the investigative detention unreasonable. Id. at
1273. In Merritt, the officer's actions were reasonable
in light of the officer's suspicion that the defendant
was a n armed and dangerous murder suspect. Id. at 1 2 7 4 .
In contrast, w e consider similar actions b y Officer
LeMasters to b e unreasonable because the justification
for the detention w a s merely to ensure h e r safety while
advising a lawfully armed motorist to cease honking h i s
horn.
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King, 990 F.2d at 1563 n.6.
C.

THE POLICE CONDUCT HERE EXCEEDED
BOUNDS OF A PERMISSIBLE TERRY STOP.

THE

Officer Tuttle failed to use the least intrusive means
necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop.

Seelye sets forth

a number of the factors to be considered:
(1) the number of officers and police cars involved, (2)
the nature of the crime and whether there is reason to
believe the suspect is armed, (3) the strength of the
officer's articulable, objective suspicions, (4) the need
for immediate action by the officer, (5) the presence or
lack of suspicious behavior or movement by the person
under observation, and
(6) whether there was an
opportunity for the officer to have made the stop in less
threatening circumstances.
Seelye, 815 F.2d at 50.
1.

The police outnumbered
who was alone.

The facts here are undisputed
uniformed

officers,

while

appellant

was

appellant,

that there were
alone.

This

suggests that drawn guns should have been unnecessary.
States v. Prior, 941 F.2d 427, 430

(6th Cir.)

three
factor

Cf. United

(drawing weapon

reasonable where officer alone with two suspects), cert, denied,
502 U.S. 993, 112 S.Ct. 613, 116 L.Ed.2d 635 (1991); United States
v. Lane, 909 F.2d 895

(6th Cir.1990)

(drawing weapon reasonable

during "lone officer's encounter with a fleeing suspect"), cert.
denied, 498 U.S. 1093, 111 S. Ct. 977, 112 L.Ed.2d 1062
United

States v. Nargi, 732 F.2d

1102

(2nd Cir. 1984)

(1991);
(three

officers justified in drawing weapons where second suspect was
missing and may have been armed and hiding in stopped van suspected
of marijuana smuggling).
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suspect
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any ci ime.
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Mr. Petit was not suspected of any
crime ,
and
the
officer ' s
articulable, objective
suspicions
were weak.
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Compare United States v. Hensley, •;- I
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. .

Here there was no
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J

.

*a ~e.

. .

a vehicle

r h e y haa

u

stopped);

L.Ed.^d

>ns

Carroll

v.

a::

approaching,

, *i
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State,

United

636
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States
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suspect);

t he

Bright v. State, 455 S.E.2d 37 (Ga.) (murder suspect reaching under
seat),

cert, denied,

116

Merritt, 695 F.2d 1263

S.Ct.

196

(1995);

(10th Cir. 1982)

United

States

v.

(murder suspect), cert.

denied, 461 U.S. 916, 103 S.Ct. 1898, 77 L.Ed.2d 286 (1983).
In contrast, the level of suspicion here was minimal.
Officer Tuttle saw a sudden movement by Mr. Petit upon his being
startled by the three officers.

This movement was consistent with

reaching for a weapon, but equally consistent with spilling a cup
of coffee.

The only additional

fact

contributing

to Officer

Tuttle's suspicion was the location in a high crime area.

The

facts here are dangerously close to being a mere hunch, which
cannot support a minimal Terry stop.
1132, 1137 (Utah 1989) .

State v. Schlosser, 774 P. 2d

The suspicion here is not sufficient to

justify the highly intrusive and forceful police conduct here.
3.

While the circumstances were such
that Officer Tuttle had to act
quickly on the perceived safety
threat created by appellant's sudden
movement, the police should have
used less intrusive means.

Mr. Petit concedes that officers need to act quickly on
perceived
officers

safety
should

develops.

threats.
be

He does not

powerless

to

act

advocate

until

a

a rule

genuine

that

threat

The question here is whether the police response was

reasonably related in scope to the perceived threat.
Terry contemplates a narrowly focused inquiry aimed at
confirming

or

dispelling

an

officer's

suspicions.

" [T] he

investigative methods employed should be the least intrusive means
reasonably available to verify or dispel the officer's suspicion in
14

a short period of time."

Royer, 460 U.S. at 500.

Terry thus

contemplates questioning, rather than the more intrusive incidents
of a formal arrest.

If questioning elicits probable cause to

arrest, an arrest may then take place.
Here, the approach taken by the police was to arrest
first and ask questions later.

It is highly significant that

Officer Tuttle never asked Mr. Petit what he was reaching for, of
whether he was reaching for a weapon.

That approach could have

dispelled the officer's concerns in a far less obtrusive manner
than the full shake down by three officers that occurred here.

The

lack of any questioning indicates that the officer was not nearly
so concerned with what Mr. Petit may have dropped or been reaching
for

as

arresting

him,

situation out later.

searching

him,

and

sorting

the

whole

The mere existence of the Pioneer Park high

crime area in Salt Lake City does not permit officers to arrest any
member of the populace at whim.
Merely drawing his gun out of its holster, without aiming
it directly at Mr. Petit, would have been sufficient to protect the
officers from any perceived danger.

Cf. United States v. White,

648 F.2d 29, 34 (D.C.Cir.), cert, denied, 454 U.S. 924, 102 S.Ct.
424, 70 L.Ed.2d 233 (1981).
The significance of the pointed gun is that it makes the
encounter far more frightening than if the officer's gun
remains holstered, or even drawn but pointed down at his
side; and certainly where the danger of the encounter to
the officer, though potentially serious, is not clear and
present, the deliberate pointing of a gun at the suspect
is problematic.
[ ]
It would be a sad day for the
people of the United States if police had carte blanche
to point a gun at each and every person of whom they had
15

an "articulable
activity.

suspicion"

of

engaging

in

criminal

United States v. Serna-Barreto, 842 F.2d 965, 967 (7th Cir. 1988)
(cite omitted) . At least in the Pioneer Park area, it appears that
the sad day described in Serna-Barreto has arrived.
Mr. Petit was entirely compliant with police commands.
When ordered to stop, he stopped.

When ordered to place his hands

in sight on the steering wheel, he did so.

Once Mr. Petit was

compliant, there was certainly no need for Officer Tuttle to point
his firearm directly at Mr. Petit, yet he continued to do so.
While

the

officers

had

a

right

to

approach

Mr.

Petit

in

a

consensual encounter, this encounter was no longer consensual. Mr.
Petit was being held at gunpoint.
The officers' actions in continuing to hold Mr. Petit at
gunpoint, continuing to approach, and not asking any questions to
confirm or dispel Officer Tuttle's concerns were not minimally
intrusive, and were not the least intrusive means of confirming or
dispelling the officer's concerns.
probable cause.

Mr. Petit was arrested without

The officers did nothing to confirm or dispel his

concern that Mr. Petit may have been reaching for a weapon to use
to assault the officers -- instead they proceeded in a manner
indistinguishable from a full-blown felony arrest.
Mr.

Petit was arrested without probable

motion to suppress should have been granted.

16

cause.

His

REASONS SUPPORTING ORAL ARGUMENT AND PUBLISHED DECISION
Utah has little case law addressing limits on force that
may be used in a Terry stop, and none addressing drawn weapons.

A

published opinion would be beneficial to the bench and bar.

CONCLUSION
Because the officers' conduct was unreasonably forceful
and less intrusive actions would have been adequate to protect
their safety, their actions constitute an arrest without probable
cause.

Mr. Petit!s motion to suppress should have been granted.

This Court should reverse and remand with directions that the
motion to suppress be granted and Mr. Petit be allowed to withdraw
his conditional plea.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

£L#

day of June, 1996.

^W-—

ROBERT K. HEINEMAN
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

MARK R. MOFFAT
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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ADDENDUM A
Statutes, Rules, and Constitutional Provisions

The

fourth

amendment

to

the

federal

constitution

provides:
[Unreasonable searches and seizures.]
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons,
houses,
papers,
and
effects,
against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable
cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.

Article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution provides:
Sec. 14.
[Unreasonable searches forbidden -- Issuance
of warrant.]
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no
warrant shall issue but upon probable cause supported by
oath or affirmation, particularly describing the place to
be searched, and the person or thing to be seized.

Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-15 (1995) provides:
77-7-15.
Authority of peace officer to stop and
question suspect -- Grounds.
A peace office may stop any person in a public
place when he has a reasonable suspicion to believe he
has committed or is in the act of committing or is
attempting to commit a public offense and may demand his
name, address and an explanation of his actions.

